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Abstract 
 This thesis analyzes the cost associated with the Minuteman III (MM III) weapon 
system.  The research develops three models for determining MM III costs per alert hour 
(CPAH).  The first model is based on the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
cost per flying hour model.  The model is modified to include depot level reparables, 
consumables, and personnel costs.  The second model is based on the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group cost per flying hour model and 
is formulated using service-wide data from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost tool.  The 
third model is a comprehensive model including indirect costs associated the ICBM-
supporting installations.  
Additionally, this thesis includes a CPAH for each echelon or level of 
management for the MM III.  As expected, the costs to operate the weapon system 
increase as more functions are included at each level of management.  The data reveals a 
relatively small marginal CPAH at the lowest levels.  However, due to the robust support 
structure for the MM III, the models reveal significant fixed alert-hour costs.  Finally, the 
thesis discusses the workings of the MM III cost structure that may benefit future 
budgeting decisions.  Specifically, the step functions associated with each level of 
management and the large fixed costs.  This thesis presents the three models as a starting 
point for developing a CPAH predictive model in future research. 
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MINUTEMAN III COST PER ALERT HOUR ANALYSIS 
 
I.  Introduction 
 “Deterrence can be limited and simple or, as it turned out, expansive and complex.” 
Hans M. Kristensen-director of Nuclear Information Project 
General Issue 
Why study intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) cost per alert hour (CPAH)?  
The September 2008 Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear 
Weapons Management, more commonly known as the Schlesinger Report identified 
many shortcomings of the nuclear community and laid the groundwork to bolster the 
defense community’s understanding of the enterprise.  A part of this encompassing effort 
was to create a deeper understanding of the nuclear enterprise workings.  One such 
vehicle is an advanced academic degree from the Air Force Institute of Technology 
(AFIT) focusing on the nuclear enterprise and how it relates to logistics and supply chain 
management.  An integral part of the degree is a collaborative thesis with experts in the 
field in focused areas needing additional research.  These above situations have 
culminated in the need for a deeper understanding of the nuclear enterprise, which is 
addressed in part by understanding the cost factors associated with keeping our 
Minuteman III (MM III) missiles on alert.  Mr. Michael Donley, Secretary of the Air 
Force, and General Norton Schwartz, Air Force Chief of Staff, have identified Nuclear 
Deterrence Operations as the first of twelve “Air Force Core Functions.”  Within this 
core function are three elements, two of which are directly relate to the costs of 
maintaining and operating our ICBMs: upgrading the MM III system and replacing the 
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UH-1N helicopters that fly in the missile complexes (SAF/FM, 2011:34).  The stated 
objective is to maintain the current ICBM force through 2030.  With the historical O&M 
and military personnel increases in cost (see Figure 1), it is imperative to ensure that 
keeping our ICBMs viable can be obtained within the given budget.   
 
Figure 1: ICBM O&M and Military Personnel Costs (in millions) (AFTOC, 2012) 
 
ICBM procurement and sustainment have always been complex endeavors.  Neil 
Sheehan describes the political and commercial influences of the early missile 
developments in his biographical-novel about Bernard Schriever’s foundational work on 
the ICBM enterprise (Sheehan, 2009).  The complexity has continued into the current 
missile support structure.  Much of the complexity is inherent due to the size of the 
weapon system (WS); moreover, some complexity is present by design for security 
reasons.  Lastly, as with any large program, there are likely some areas that should be 
streamlined.   
  All figures for this thesis are based on fiscal year 2011 (FY11) figures unless 
otherwise stated.  Historical figures have been converted from “then year dollars” to 
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FY11 dollars to account for inflation.  The 2011 budget for the entire Air Force was 
170.78 billion dollars.  Within this overall budget was the major category of O&M or 
readiness that comprised 26.8% or 45.79 billion dollars of the AF total budget.  The 
readiness portion contains the costs to operate and maintain the Air Force’s weapon 
systems and by extension, the 4.8 billion dollars calculated in the active duty cost per 
flying hour (CPFH) program (SAF/FM, 2011:21).  The Air Force uses CPFH models for 
the majority of its weapons systems and has the goal to develop a CPFH model for every 
system.  The current CPFH model has been shown to be accurate for only a narrow range 
of circumstances and that more robust models exists (Laubacher, 2004:64).  The Air 
Force has continued with its current model for decades, partially because the 
effectiveness of alternative models has not been communicated to decision makers 
(Armstrong, 2006:1) 
The cost associated with operating a weapon system is quiet complex.  Different 
bases, major commands (MAJCOMs), the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
(AFCAIG) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Group (OSD 
CAIG) have different methods of interpreting nuances when calculating a weapon 
system’s CPFH.  Moreover, some detail is blurred as data is aggregated at each level.  
ICBM cost-data are just as complicated as other weapon systems, possibly more so given 
their unique support attributes.  The missile alone is not operational; it requires a silo, 
launch equipment, support equipment, personnel, and communication platforms to 
function.  The system in its entirety is called WS-133A/M and includes the many 
elements shown in Figure 2.  This thesis is focused on the costs most directly attributable 
to the actual missiles and peripheral equipment.  The MM III weapon system mission 
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design (MD) is LGM-30 and is outlined in Figure 2.  The mission design series (MDS) is 
LGM-30G, but there is only one MDS currently operational within the MD, so this thesis 
will use LGM-30 throughout.   
 
Figure 2: LGM-30 vs. WS-133A/M (GTE, 1980) 
Some of the other items can be readily added to the cost of a missile, for example 
the calculated CPFH for the support helicopters, the UH-1N, is $11,703 (AFCAIG, 
2011).  The helicopters’ primary mission is supporting the MM IIIs.  However, other 
systems that support MM III operations such as communication satellites are used by 
many other systems and the satellites cannot accurately be added to the MM III cost to 
operate.  Ideally, one would be able to assess every system that supports a MM III to any 
LGM-30 
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degree, find the percentage of that support, and the costs of operating each supporting 
system.  Such an endeavor would be virtually unmanageable in scope and definition.  
Thus, the scope of this thesis focuses on the costs associated with the LGM-30 instead of 
the WS-133A/M. 
Implications 
This study (and subsequent follow-on analyses) may aid in future ICBM 
structuring.  In strategic guidance released January 2012, President Obama and Defense 
Secretary Leon Panetta state: "It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved 
with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our 
inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy" (DOD, 2012:5).  The 
future budget environment may lead policy makers to decide to reduce the overall costs 
incurred by our ICBM force.  As will be shown, closing one launch facility (LF) by 
taking one missile off-line would not reduce the overall cost.  In fact, removing one 
missile can actually increase cost due to the inherent dependency of the sub-systems and 
increased maintenance visits.  To reduce significantly the cost of maintaining the sites, an 
entire squadron of 50 missiles would need to be taken off-line (Harlow, 2011).  A 
squadron closure is a strategic decision more than an economic decision.  For example, it 
may be more cost effective to close a base and concentrate ICBMs at one location; yet it 
may be strategically necessary to maintain a dispersed presence.  There are international 
implications when dealing with such a large deactivation.  Therefore, it is not within the 
scope of this thesis to suppose any recommendations on reductions in force structure.  
Rather, this thesis will look at the costs that can be attributed to operating an ICBM at the 
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lowest level (LF) and compare those costs with the costs of operating larger groups of 
missiles at higher echelons.  There are necessary costs incurred at the higher levels of 
management that do not directly affect the missiles, yet the costs are required at those 
levels.  An example is the quality of life items at a base.  A base dining facility is not a 
direct part of launching a MM III.  However, the personnel needed to support the system 
must eat.  Therefore, the dining facility is an additional cost that does not directly go into 
the cost of maintaining a silo, but does affect the costs of maintaining an ICBM wing.   
Problem Statement 
This thesis seeks to analyze the costs of operating a LF and determine how the 
CPAH model changes as higher levels of management are incorporated into the model. 
Research Questions 
1. Can the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group (AFCAIG) and Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD CAIG) 
aircraft cost per flying hour models be used to develop cost per alert hour 
models for the LGM-30 weapon system?  If so, what are the differences? 
2. Do cost per alert hour factors change significantly based on the level of 
management?  
3. What cost drivers should be included in developing a comprehensive CPAH 
model for the LGM-30 weapon system? 
4. What is the relationship of costs and alert hours? 
7 
Summary 
This thesis develops the above ideas in Chapter II by providing a review of past 
CPFH research along with related concepts such as AFCAIG and OSD CAIG cost 
categories and ICBM specific attributes.  Chapter III builds upon the prior literature and 
develops three models for determining ICBM CPAH figures.  The first is based on 
AFGAIG elements, the second is based on OSD CAIG elements, and the final model is a 
unique comprehensive look at ICBM cost.  In Chapter IV, the author presents the analysis 
of the data.  Finally, Chapter V includes a summary of the results and provides a brief 
description of the possible implications of the models.  The thesis concludes with 
recommendations for future analyses and research efforts.  
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview  
This chapter first looks at the general mechanics of a cost per flying hour (CPFH) 
program.  Next, applications from the commercial sector are related to the flying hour 
program.  Then, this chapter expands the workings of the Air Force’s CPFH program by 
reviewing examples of how the flying hour program has been used recently.  Next, an 
example of a non-traditional cost per flying hour assessment is reviewed.  Finally, this 
chapter reviews elements that are specific to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
mission, including funding history (an insourcing versus outsourcing decision), force 
structure, and other aspects of the weapon system (WS) that relate to how much it costs 
to operate per hour.  
The Cost per Flying Hour Program   
The CPFH idea dates back as far as 1962 (Kimbrough, 2003:10).  The focus on 
managing a CPFH program was brought the forefront by Air Force costs analyst during 
the early 1990s as Cold War budgeting practices changed and the Defense Management 
Review called for more budget justifications (Rose, 1997:5).  
 The basic flying hour (FH) program is based on the Operation and Maintenance 
(O&M) costs for a particular mission design series (MDS).  The O&M cost have 
increased at a faster rate, accounting for an increasingly larger portion of the budget 
(Defense, 2006).  Increased O&M costs mean other areas such as research, development, 
and modernization efforts reduce proportionally to the budget.  The FH program 
9 
proportional relationship is defined as one where no costs are incurred if zero hours are 
flown and a 1% increase in hours results in a 1% increase in costs (Van Dyk, 2008:1).  
However, as the budget has increased, the actual number of hours flown has decreased, 
(see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3: Rising Cost of O&M per Flying Hour (Defense, 2006) 
The basic FH program uses a proportional model comprised of the expected 
number of hours to be flown multiplied times a CPFH factor.  The product is an estimate 
for the FH program budget for the subsequent year.  The model will be slightly modified 
based on unique situations, but the basic model follows the structure shown in Figure 4 
(SAF/FMC, 2005:18).   
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Figure 4: Basic CPFH Model, (SAF/FMC, 2005:18) 
 A GAO report highlighted the inaccuracies of using a cost per flying hour model 
as a predictor of expected cost for a given year (GAO, 2000:1).  Additionally, Armstrong 
found that FH predictive models to have errors as large as 25% of the total flying-hour 
program budget (Armstrong, 2006:iv).  In efforts to improve the program, the Air Force 
has progressed through multiple iterations of the CPFH methodology.  In the late 1990s, 
the Air Force was repeatedly flying fewer hours than were budgeted (GAO, 2000:2).  
Flying units were expending the allotted funds before the budgeted (expected) hours were 
flown.  The result necessitated grounding aircraft or soliciting congress for more funds.  
To increase accuracy in the program, each major command (MAJCOM) initiated a new 
process that calculated the number of expected flying hours based on the number of pilots 
needed for the assigned missions and training (Hess, 2009:18).  The new method has 
increased the steady-state (peacetime or baseline) projected flying hours; hours for 
contingency operations are budgeted separately (SAF/FM, 2011:8).  The other major 
element to the basic model is the CPFH factor.   
 The CPFH factor, as described by the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group (AFCAIG) for aviation, includes 1) Materiel Support Division (MSD) managed 
Depot Level Reparables (DLRs) and consumable spares, 2) consumable supplies 
procured via the General Support Division (GSD) and the Government Purchase Card 
(GPC), and 3) aviation fuel.  Another iteration of the FH program took place in 2008 
when the Air Force switched from allowing each MAJCOM to develop the above factors 
 Projected 
Flying Hours 
FH Program 
Budget 
Projected 
CPFH Factor 
 
X = 
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used in computing a CPFH for a MDS.  The factors are now developed by the 
Centralized Asset Management (CAM) office for each MDS.   
The DLR costs include some overhead costs; thus, the CPFH includes some fixed 
cost and is not a solely variable cost metric.  The MSD and GSD items number in the 
hundreds and thousands respectively.  Each item is individually forecasted for demand 
and expected cost by collecting two years of demand data and dividing it through the 
number of flying hours over the same period (Hess, 2009:19).  The total of all those 
forecast are compiled at the weapon system level by the CAM office.  The Spares 
Requirement Review Board projects the demand for each item, including adjustments for 
unique situations such as planned maintenance and warranties.  The final demand is 
multiplied by the projected price of each part; however, the projected price of the parts 
has been known to fluctuate significantly throughout the year (Kirby, 2010).  There are 
also some savings from bulk purchases that are not reflected in this calculation.  The 
result can (at times) be over or under budgeting the cost of parts needed for the upcoming 
year.  When there is a surplus of money for a specific part, it is redistributed to other parts 
that may be under budgeted (Kirby, 2010).  The fluctuation in part-costs, unexpected 
maintenance costs, and the interaction of fixed costs with a per-hour measurement create 
inaccuracies in the FH program (Rose, 1997:8).  There is significantly less fluctuation 
with the consumables factor.  Consumables are calculated using three years historical 
data, then normalized for inflation and total hours flown (Hess, 2009:20).  Beyond the 
basic three elements discussed above, previous literature has proposed numerous 
alternatives (see Table 1).  Some of the factors that could relate to the ICBM mission are 
discussed in the next section.  
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Table 1: Alternative CPFH Factors 
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Dependent Factors
Operations/Support Costs X X
Number of Parts Replacements X
Maintenance Work Hours X
Net Flying Costs X X
CPFH Factor X X X X
Flying Hours X X X X X X
Lagged Cost X X
Aircraft Age X X X X X X X
Average Total Operating Hours X X
Flyaway Cost X X X
IOC Year X
Aircraft Type X X
MAJCOM X X
Percent Engine Type X
Percent Block X
Sorties X X
Average Sortie Duration X X X X
Utilization Rate X X X
Mission Capable Rate X X
Cannibilization Rate X
Deployments X X X
Ground Days X
Total Aircraft Inventory X
Program Change X X
Base Location X
Petroleum Proximity X X X
Temperature X X X
Dew Point X
Month/Seasonality X X X
Constract Support X
Personnel Costs X
Independent Factors
 
The inaccuracy of the basic CPFH model has been highlighted by historic surges 
and lulls in flying hours.  If the costs per flying hour model were relatively accurate, one 
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would expect the cost to increase and decrease linearly with the number of hours flown.  
For example, during contingency operations such as Operation Desert Storm and Kosovo 
Air Campaign, many of our airframes saw increased flying hours that were not budgeted 
for in the previous year.  Wallace, Houser, and Lee found that when the CPFH model was 
used to estimate maintenance costs for the increased hours, the C-5Bs had a predicted 
demand for parts of over 200%  of actual parts demanded (Wallace et al, 2000:1-2).  
Their model was validated with KC-10, F-16C, and C-17 data from Kosovo that over-
estimated the cost of increasing the number of hours flown.  The reason the costs did not 
increase linearly has been debated.  The researchers proposed a model including three 
failure modes: dormant, cycle induced, and operations based.  They conclude that the 
most accurate model includes the proportion of time each MDS spends in one of the three 
identified states (Wallace et al, 2000:2-2).  Aircraft experience more failures in relation to 
takeoff and landing counts than in relation to the hours flown, especially heavier aircraft 
(Slay and Sherbrooke, 2000:1-1).  Therefore, a model that is solely based on flying hours 
will overestimate the maintenance cost for hours accumulated with longer sorties (Slay 
and Sherbrooke, 2000, 1-2).  One reason the per-hour costs decrease (increase at a lower 
rate than hours flown) with increased sortie durations (and fewer sorties), relates to the 
combinations of failure types.  Ebeling describes five different methods of inducing a 
failure (Ebeling, 2009:50) 
- Hourly operation time 
- Operating cycles 
- Clock time 
- Failures on demand 
- Maintenance-induced failures 
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For a CPFH model to accurately predict maintenance cost, failures would need to 
primarily occur from hourly operation time and total clock time.  Dawson and Howe 
looked into the average sortie duration (ASD) in relation to an aircraft’s CPFH and found 
that the longer duration flights serve to decrease CPFH (Dawson, 2006:22).  Their 
observation is that aircraft experience higher rates of failure on demand.  Meaning, the 
aircraft are more likely to fail (experience a scenario where a maintenance action is 
required and a maintenance cost is incurred) when they go through the sortie process as 
opposed to increasing the sortie duration.  For example, two sorties of one hour each will 
cost more than one two-hour sortie.   
The Air Force has recognized the influence of age on the cost of maintaining our 
weapon systems (Schwartz, 2011:7).  The failure modes identified by Ebeling are critical 
for ICBMs, because missile maintainers state that LGM-30s are a system with significant 
effects of aging manifesting (Doyle, 2012).  As a system ages, the O&M costs for that 
system increase exponentially (Unger, 2008:24).  In an interview with missile 
maintainers, they described the maintenance rates of the MM III weapon system 
components as also experiencing failure upon demand (Doyle, 2012).  Together, the 
components utilized during a maintenance action create an increasing rate of 
maintenance-induced failures.  The maintenance-induced failures do not mean that the 
maintenance teams are haphazardly breaking components.  Rather, a component that is 
functioning while undisturbed may fail once it is removed to access a deeper component, 
replaced, and tested.  The Air Force has sought to mitigate the increasing maintenance 
cost of our aging systems through a series of recapitalization and modernization 
initiatives (Schwartz, 2011).  However, in addition the actual costs of the initiatives, the 
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replaced parts must have a significantly higher reliability to justify replacing the part 
versus dealing with increasing repair costs (Ebeling, 2009:265).  Some components 
designed as part of modernization efforts actually have experienced lower reliability rates 
than the original components (Doyle, 2012 and Lorenz, 2011).  Certainly, the goal is to 
have components that meet the stringent reliability thresholds, and many of the ICBM 
components do achieve the needed reliability rates (Lorenz, 2011).  Unfortunately, a 
single item with a relatively high failure rate can spawn more maintenance visits and 
increase the likelihood of maintenance induced failures.  
 
Figure 5: Bathtub Curve (Ebeling, 2009:31) 
A concern with the introduction of new parts is failures from burn-in.  A common 
model for visualizing lifetime failure rates is the bathtub curve as shown in Figure 5 
(Ebeling, 2009:31).  Many CPFH rates for Air Force MDS follow a bathtub curve 
(Hawkes and White, 2008:15).  Not all MDS have been shown empirically to follow this 
curve; some systems have linearly increasing failure rates (Hildebrandt and Sze, 
1990:23).  The burn-in failure rates of new components (either replacement or 
modifications) can be compounded by the age of the system (Unger, 2008:31).  Consider 
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the conceptual bathtub curve presented in Figure 5.  Then, imagine that in addition to the 
given parameters, new items with burn-in rates are added on the right side after the 
system already has an increasing failure rate.  The added burn-in failures can make the 
observed failure rate increase exponentially.  The failure rates would then be 
compounded by the end of service life failures, for both a bathtub curve and a linearly 
increasing failure rate (Hildebrandt and Sze, 1990:21).   
Related Applications from the Commercial Sector  
The CPFH metric is a per-unit measurement; similar metrics are used throughout 
the commercial sector (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998:15).  The trouble is that a per-unit 
measurement provides a false sense of costs distributions.  For example, if a factory is 
producing 100 items and the total operating cost is $1000, the temptation is to believe 
that it cost $10 to make one item.  However, an Activity Based Costing (ABC) analysis 
may reveal excess capacity and show that the factory could produce 200 items without a 
two-fold cost increase.  ABC seeks to find out how much it cost to complete a specific 
activity such as paint widgets, package widgets, etc.  Once all the activity costs are 
totaled, a more accurate picture is obtained about the costs of producing the items.  
Taking the example further, if sales are slow and they only sell half as many items, the 
per-unit cost allocation would say that it now cost $20 to produce the items when the 
actual cost of producing one item did not significantly change.  Additionally, if the 
factory produces half as many items, not all per-unit costs are recouped (Lambert, 
2008:44).  Lambert describes the importance of accurately capturing the effect of 
reducing the number of items produced with what he calls “segment profitability.”  
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Without the key enablers of segment profitability: data availability, data accuracy, and 
state of the art system capabilities, a company [or government entity] will not know the 
implications of a production change (Lambert, 2008:48).  For the ICBM community, this 
means that a cost increase per missile may be the result of cost increases of required 
activities.  The apparent cost increase may also occur because the number of missiles was 
reduced (with costs staying relatively the same) or a combination of the two situations.  
Chapter III and IV of this thesis provide an analysis as which scenario seems to be 
occurring with the LGM-30. 
ABC examples in the military 
“The ability to forecast accurately starts at the lowest level possible; this is the 
wing/base level in the USAF” (Armstrong, 2006:2).  Furthermore, a true ABC model 
would start at the root action and determine a cost for that action.  A macro example is 
looking at the many functions or activities performed by the DOD.  The cost of National 
Defense is often equated to the budget of the entire DOD.  However, the DOD completes 
other activities including “nation-building, policing foreign nations, humanitarian 
missions and ferrying executive and legislative-branch leaders and their attendants 
around the globe” (Factor, 2011:1).  Such activities do not directly contribute to war 
fighting capabilities; rather they are more a function of our foreign policy.  The Marines 
implemented many ABC initiatives in the late 1990s.  One key element they identified 
was the ability to ensure multiple systems are able to communicate the associated cost of 
an activity (Chadwick, 2007:3).   
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Activity Based Costing has been used in the Navy as well.  In 1999 and 2000, the 
Navy spent about $100,000 and 6 months implementing ABC at the Naval Air Depot in 
Jacksonville, Florida.  The revamped processes revealed that only 51 of 213 activities 
added value to the repair process.  The activities were reduced to 66 activities with an 
annual savings of $200 million (Dekker, 2003).  Fully implementing ABC requires the 
organization to be committed to the entire process.  An ABC undertaking is beyond the 
scope of a thesis, however, it is beneficial to see how such a transformation has been used 
in other military settings and could feasibly be implemented for base-level support to the 
Minuteman III weapon system.  
Recent CPFH Examples.   
Most CPFH analyses involve efforts to develop more accurate CPFH models (see 
Table 1).  To develop stronger models, the researchers try to identify more accurate 
predictors or input variables (Armstrong, 2006:12).  Dr. David Lee proposed a physics-
based model including take-off/landing cycles, ground hours, and flying-hour variables 
(Wallace, 2000:2-1).  Some of the suggested models have outperformed the current 
models and others have only marginally varied from the current AFCAIG model.  
Nonetheless, the proposed models have not been widely incorporated into the AFCAIG 
process (Van Dyk, 2008:4).  
 Figure 6 shows how the AFCAIG elements used to develop the AFCAIG CPFH 
model can be considered a subset of the more comprehensive OSD CAIG elements.  The 
ODS CAIG elements changed in 2008 from seven items to the six items shown below 
(AFTOC, 2012).  The new OSD CAIG cost elements are calculated by including the 
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AFCAIG items, plus AFI 65-503 Logistics Cost Factors, plus other cost elements such as 
mission personnel, contractor support, sustaining support and indirect support.   
1. Unit Personnel 
2. Unit Operations 
3. Maintenance 
4. Sustaining Support 
5. Continuing System Improvements 
6. Indirect Support 
AFCAIG Elements + + 
Reparable Parts +
+
Consumable Parts Modification Costs
+
Aviation Fuel
= AFCAIG COST PER 
FLYING HOUR  
= AFI 65-503 LOGISTICS 
COST FACTORS
= OPERATING COST, 
OSD CAIG CPFH
= Total OWNWERSHIP 
COST
OPERATING COST, OSD 
CAIG CPFH
AFI 65-503 LOGISTIC 
COST FACTORS
Other Cost Elements: 
Misison Personnel, Non-
fly Unit Level Supplies, 
Contractor Support, 
Sustaining Support, and 
Indirect Support
Depot Purchased 
Equipment, Depot Level 
Maintenanc, etc.
 
Figure 6: Increasing Factors Considered in AFCAIG and OSD CAIG 
CPFH Models (Kirby, 2011) 
 
The AFTOC tool gathers the data used to compute the models from numerous 
sources (see Table 2) and allocates the costs based on the AFTOC business rules (Kirby, 
2012:2).  All the aforementioned factors comprise the weapon system operating costs; 
modification costs are added to the operating cost to obtain the ownership cost (Kirby, 
2012:4). 
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Table 2: AFTOC Data Sources 
•Financial •Supply 
–GAFS-R –SBSS 
–ABIDES –DO35K 
–IDECS –DO43 
–TWCF –AFLMA 
•Maintenance –GCSS-AF 
–FAS •Munitions 
–REMIS –CAS 
  
–Training 
Munitions 
•Personnel •Factors 
–E300Z –AFI 65-503 
Non-traditional CPFH Example   
Some weapon systems do not readily conform to the AFCAIG CPFH model and 
the OSD CAIG Operation and Ownership models (as shown in Figure 4).  If the AFCAIG 
model must be modified, by extension, the OSD CAIG model will be slightly different.  
For example, a thesis by Kimbrough analyzed the factors that best suit two satellite MDS 
(2004:6).  He looked at costs that comprise the majority of the O&M phase of the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite System 
(MILSTAR).  He focused on manpower variables, given that they comprised about 75% 
of the O&M costs of the satellites.  Where the traditional AFCAIG model uses aviation 
fuel, DLRs, and consumables, Kimbrough’s model used Critical Space Contract 
Operations, Critical Space Operations—Direct Support, and DLR—Non-Flying 
(Kimbrough, 2004:34).  The model’s predictive power was primarily found in accounting 
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for the total manpower costs and expected increases in cost of living allowances, pay 
increases, and inflation.  
Elements Specific to the ICBM Mission 
 ICBM alert hours are different from aircraft flying hours in three important 
aspects.  The alert hours do not vary from year to year, the variable costs drivers are 
different, and the weapon system is stationary (granted, it is capable of intercontinental 
use, but the cost of an alert hour is associated with a stationary system).  The goal is to 
have every missile constantly on alert; the weapon system boasts near 100% mission 
capable rates (Donley, 2012).  However, there is a requirement for scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance.  When a single missile is taken “off-alert” for maintenance, 
the costs associated with being on alert are still incurred.  The site is still secured, manned 
and the flight still has all the costs of being on alert (alert costs are explained in further 
detail in Chapter III).  Therefore, the costs measured for an alert hour can actually be 
greater than an off-alert hour (Harlow, 2011).  When a missile is removed from a site, it 
is called a warm site.  Again, due to the increased maintenance demand, the cost of a 
warm site can actually be higher than a fully functioning site.  However, in a study 
conducted at Malmstrom AFB based on FY11 data, the budget office found that a long-
term warm site could be operated at about 27% of the cost of fully functioning site 
(Steely, 2011:2). 
 Given that the weapon system is stationary, it incurs costs differently than aircraft.  
The details will be provided in Chapter III; here though, it is important to note how fixed 
costs have been analyzed in CPFH literature.  Aircraft have costs that accumulate 
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regardless of any sorties generated.  Variables such as temperature, weapon system age, 
time spent on the ramp, and cannibalization all lead to costs incurred for aircraft while on 
the ground.  Using log-linear least square regression with a non-zero intercept was found 
to more accurately predicted changes in CPFH (Van Dyk, 2008:80).  Many of the above 
factors affecting aircraft, leading to the validity of a non-zero intercept, are also present 
for ICBMs. 
Unique ICBM Funding History  
 Neil Sheehan recounts the origins of the ICBM program in a biography of 
Bernard Schriever.  He describes the multifaceted approach Schriever took to accomplish 
developing the ICBM program in a short amount of time.  Many contracts were made 
with manufacturers, suppliers, construction companies, and engineering divisions.  The 
contracts were all managed in-house by Schriever’s team (Sheehan, 2009).  Over time, 
the management of the ICBM program evolved through multiple homes in the DOD 
including Strategic Air Command, Air Force Space Command, and Air Force Global 
Strike Command.  Until 1997, the Air Force managed the many contracts for the ICBMs.  
In 1997, Northrup Grumman was selected as the ICBM Prime Integration Contractor 
(IPIC) on a 15-year contract expiring in FY12.  The DOD policy no longer allows 
integration contractors without explicit approval; therefore, the process will revert to a 
structure similar to the pre-1997 structure (Harlow, 2011).  Insourcing the integration 
contract will bring opportunities for more direct oversight and potential savings.  
However, just as in the commercial sector, not all decisions to insource or outsource are 
based on monetary factors alone (Johnson, Leenders, and Flynn, 2011:129). 
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Out/Insourcing Based on Factors Other Than Just Cost 
The goal of cost models is to better understand how costs are distributed.  An 
increased understanding of cost distributions can allow management to make better 
financial decisions (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998:107).  However, cost is only one element 
of the decision process.  In one ABC study, the Army found childcare facilities on Army 
installations cost up to twice as much as comparable commercial facilities due to higher 
worker-child ratios and higher wages.  The Army decided (as of the writing of the thesis) 
to keep the childcare facilities open based on troop morale and convenience (Peters, 
1999:1).  Similarly, if an aspect of the nuclear enterprise is deemed critical for strategic 
purposes, then it may be maintained even if there were a more cost effective alternative.  
Civilian businesses also face decisions to insource, outsource; or, as Harry Moser 
presents, they can offshore (Moser, 2012).  The factors that affect a company’s decision 
to insource, outsource, or offshore are similar to the factors that led to outsourcing the 
maintenance contract in 1997.  While the production of critical components of the nuclear 
enterprise is closely monitored, it is beneficial to consider what led (and could lead in the 
future) to outsourcing the maintenance for the LGM-30.  In the commercial sector, the 
factors leading to major outsourcing decisions are apparent in the decision to move an 
aspect of the firm overseas, also known as offshoring.  Offshoring is a unique form of 
operating in another country where the company can move in entirety, or it can outsource 
a portion of its operations to a company in another country (Moser, 2012).  Of utmost 
concern to a commercial enterprise is the profitability of such a move.  Moser asserts than 
many sourcing decisions are based on price alone, resulting in 20-30% miscalculation of 
actual costs (Moser, 2012).  Numerous factors affect the decision to outsource (or 
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insource a previously outsourced function).  Outsourcing may result in increased risks, 
increased lead times, supply restraints and unexpected fees (Johnson, et al, 2011:128).  
Dr. Thomas Goldsby states that out of 50 multi-billion dollar companies who decided to 
outsource overseas, 75% were dissatisfied with their return on investment.  He attributed 
the unexpected meager returns to a lack of assessing all parameters, which lead to 
unexpected outcomes (Goldsby, 2012).  Therefore, it is imperative for a company and 
government entities to consider all the affected aspects of a situation before making 
major change in process (Johnson, et al, 2011:129).  Similarly, the Air Force has 
observed that some decisions to outsource did not turn out to save as much as first 
expected (Harlow, 2011).   
ICBM CPAH Considerations  
CPAH is not an operationally flexible metric like CPFH.  Missile alert hours are 
not adjusted in the same way that scheduled flying hours are adjusted based on the 
approved yearly budget.  Unger modified a CPFH model and found that the proportional 
method used to determine CPFH amounts is only accurate when the number of hours 
flown is relatively close to the number of hours used to develop the CPFH value (Unger, 
2008:87).  The area of accuracy is narrowed for the LGM-30, given that ICBMs have a 
constant number of alert hours.  The proportional model can lead decision makers to 
believe that flying one less hour will save the full CPFH amount and that adding one 
more hour will require a full CPFH amount increase.  However, the non-proportional 
nature of the CPFH [and certainly the CPAH] models make for poor marginal analysis 
(Hess, 2009:35).  
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564
th
 MS Deactivation Case Study  
The 2006 Quadrennial Review directed DOD to “Reduce the number of deployed 
Minuteman III ballistic missiles from 500 to 450 beginning in Fiscal Year 2007” 
(Rumsfeld, 2006:50).  The Air Force selected the 564
th
 Missile Squadron (MS) of the 
341
st
 Missile Wing (MW) at Malmstrom Air Force Base (AFB) to be deactivated.  The 
decision was both a strategic and financial decision.  Eliminating a squadron from the 
341
st
 MW would bring all three MWs to an equal 150 missiles each.  The 564
th
 MS may 
have been selected because it used missiles built and installed by General Electric while 
all other MM III missiles were built and installed by Boeing.  As a result, the 564
th
 MS 
missiles used different training systems and ground technologies (Woolf, 2006:10).  
Operating a common system was likely desired as a means to reduce O&M costs.  
However, eliminating a missile squadron did not show immediate savings due to the large 
deactivation costs (Woolf, 2006:11).  As shown in Figure 7, overall costs (adjusted from 
“then year dollars” to FY11 dollars) show only a minor decrease while the squadron was 
undergoing deactivation, then increased afterwards.   
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Figure 7: LGM-30 O&M Costs Over 564th MS Deactivation Period (in millions) 
(AFTOC, 2012) 
 
Since 2008, base-level costs have increased, in part, due to increased personnel 
costs.  Additionally, there have been many modernization and modification initiatives 
(Harlow, 2011).  In a memo released by the Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Donley, 
and Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, they emphasize the impacts of 
the 2013 budget.  They state that many modernization projects will be deferred to later 
years or canceled.  The LGM-30 modifications are not listed explicitly as being kept or 
canceled (Donley and Schwartz, 2012).  Figure 8 shows the impact that reducing R&D 
and Procurement has had on the LGM-30’s total expenditures in recent years.  Figure 8 
shows the total appropriated dollars for the LGM-30.  There are numerous factors 
affecting total costs; therefore, it is hard to say directly how significant the impact of 
deactivating the 564
th
 MS was to the total budget.   
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Figure 8: LGM-30 Appropriations Summary (in millions) (AFTOC, 2012) 
Malmstrom AFB is located in Great Falls, Montana; the city commissioned a 
report to assess the total dollar revenue the region around the base would likely loose due 
to the squadron’s deactivation.  Their report included payroll downsizing, reduced utility 
consumption, decreased local educational enrollments, facilities O&M, and a general 
category of “other areas” that would be affected.  The largest factor was the official 
estimate reducing the number of manning authorizations by 14.2%.  Additionally, the 
report estimated that the base would lose an additional 143 indirect positions for a total 
area payroll decrease of about 24.9 million dollars.  When added to the other categories, 
the report estimated the total decrease of revenues (Malmstrom Air Force Base spending) 
of about 30.2 million dollars (Great Falls, 2008).  These dollar figures were not verified 
by the Air Force, but show how the elimination of a squadron, if the reduced manning 
authorizations are observed, can provide a significant reduction in costs.  
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Summary 
This literature review first discussed the general mechanics of a cost per flying 
hour program.  Next, applications from the commercial sector were considered as they 
related to the flying hour program.  The chapter expanded the workings of the Air Force’s 
cost per flying hour program by reviewing examples of how the flying hour program has 
been used recently.  An example of a non-traditional cost per flying hour assessment for 
satellites was considered.  Finally, this chapter reviewed elements specific to the ICBM 
mission, including funding history, force structure, and other aspects of the weapon 
system relating to operating costs.   
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III.  Methodology 
In finding and achieving efficiencies, a fundamental challenge is cost 
visibility at the decision-making levels.  It’s at this point where data – both 
qualitative and quantitative – can be used to paint an accurate picture of 
the options for senior leaders.  But absent such cost visibility – and good 
data – we struggle to make the right budget choices. 
The Honorable Erin C. Conaton, Under Secretary of the Air Force 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents how data are obtained and what analysis methodology is 
used to answer the four research questions from Chapter 1.  The chapter begins by 
scoping the analysis and explaining the methodology goals of the.  Next, the chapter 
describes the processes and data used to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group (AFCAIG) cost per alert hour 
(CPAH) model.  Then, the chapter describes the process and data used for developing an 
ICBM Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD 
CAIG) CPAH metric.  Finally, the chapter shows how the data can be combined to 
develop a comprehensive model, accounting for indirect ICBM costs.  The results from 
each model are presented in Chapter 4.  
Methodology Overview 
 The overall approach is to develop a model for determining ICBM CPAH and to 
assess the CPAH at different levels of management.  The first part of this approach is 
based on the AFCAIG and OSD CAIG CPFH models.  The second aspect of the 
methodology is similar, though not identical, to how Activity Based Costing (ABC) can 
highlight administrative costs that are rolled into operating cost at each hierarchical level 
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of management.  For the ICBM enterprise, this thesis assesses costs starting with the 
single launch facility (LF), then the missile alert facility (MAF) or flight level (10 
missiles), squadron level (50 missiles), missile wing (MW) (150 missiles), and the 
weapon system (WS) (450 missiles).  The WS costs are calculated at the command level 
(AFGSC) and the LGM-30G mission series design (MSD) level.  The MSD level is 
divided by the same number of hours as the command level, but also includes depot costs 
not included at the command level.  Each echelon total is divided by the number of alert 
hours managed at the given level.  In actuality, each level acquires slightly fewer alert 
hours than the indicated amount.  However, the actual amount is less than .01 different 
than mathematical totals indicated in Table 3.  Additionally, given that a non-alert hour 
will likely have equal or greater costs (due to maintenance and security actions), all 
calculations are based on the mathematical totals for alert hours shown in Table 3.  
Table 3: Alert Hours by Echelon 
Echelon Alert Hours Per Year Alerts Per Year 
Launch Facility 8,760 365 
Missile Alert Facility 87,600 3650 
Missile Squadron 438,000 18,250 
Missile Wing 1,314,000 54,750 
Command and WS  3,942,000 164,250 
 
Data Sources 
The AFCAIG model is derived for the WS, AFGSC, and the wing levels using 
data from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) system.  The lower levels 
require personal interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) to determine the depot, 
squadron, flight, and missile costs.  The wing data is acquired via the AFTOC system and 
personal interviews with base-level SMEs, providing a comparative value from two 
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perspectives.  The OSD CAIG model includes more elements than the AFCAIG model 
and requires more data.  The data for the ODS CAIG assessments is compiled from 
numerous legacy systems into the AFTOC tool (see Table 2).  The data set is massive and 
can be cumbersome, but making the task more manageable are standard queries that 
provide the needed data.  However, the standard queries are limited to higher-level 
reports for the MDS, command, wing, and base levels.  Data are not attributed to a 
specific squadron, flight, or LF in the standard queries.  Therefore, the OSD CAIG model 
is only used for the three top levels of management.   
This thesis follows basic ABC principles but is not a full ABC assessment.  
“AFTOC is not an Activity Based Cost Accounting System, but is the closest thing the 
Air Force has to one” (McNutt, 2012:6).  Developing a traditional cost dictionary for 
every action in the nuclear enterprise is beyond the scope of a thesis and would be 
virtually impossible given the magnitude of the enterprise.  The data for the weapon 
system, command, and wing are census data, meaning that they include all the data feeds 
compiled in AFTOC.  The data for the lower levels are samples from one base/wing and 
squadron.  The data for the MAFs and LFs are assumed to be constant across the 
command.  This assumption is valid for depot level reparables (DLRs) and personnel 
costs, but consumable costs can vary based on the mileage disparity of each MAF and 
LF.  The wing chosen is the 341
st
 MW at Malmstrom AFB in Great Falls, Montana.  The 
squadron sampled is the 490
th
 MS.  Malmstrom is analyzed for three reasons.  First, the 
choice is limited to Malmstrom and F.E. Warren because these locations do not have an 
active flying wings that could distort the allocation of indirect costs.  Secondly, the 
researcher was stationed at Malmstrom prior to being assigned to the Air Force Institute 
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of Technology (AFIT) and knew many of the contacts needed to collect the data.  Finally, 
Malmstrom’s sampled costs are very close to the average for the three missile wings (see 
Table 4). 
Table 4. ICBM Wing OSD CAIG Operating Cost Comparisons 
F.E. Warren $164,410,482 
Malmstrom $153,257,407 
Minot $142,538,245 
Average $153,402,045 
 
The personal interviews with SMEs and the AFTOC system provided ample data 
for each echelon (see Figures 9 and 10).  However, the data are not available for all 
echelons from one source.  The AFTOC data does not provide the fidelity to assign cost 
to a specific squadron, MAF, or LF with the standard reports.  The SMEs provided the 
lower-level data for the AFCAIG elements and two of the OSD CAIG elements. 
 
LGM-30G Wing Squadron
Flight 
(MAF)
Missile 
(LF)
DLR SPO AFTOC
CONs AFMC AFMC
Personnel SPO* MAFB  
Figure 9: AFCAIG Data Availability 
LGM-30G Wing Squadron
Flight 
(MAF)
Missile 
(LF)
1.0 Unit Personnel
2.0 Unit Operations
3.0 Maintenance
4.0 Sustaining Support
5.0 Continuing  Improvements
6.0 Indirect Support
AFTOC
MAFB
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Figure 10: OSD CAIG Data Availability 
 
AFCAIG CPAH Models 
 
Figure 11: AFCAIG Model 
The AFCAIG CPFH model, as it was described in Chapter II for aircraft, uses 
DLRs, consumables, and aviation fuel as the three cost drivers.  The ICBM AFCAIG 
CPAH model uses DLRs, consumables, and personnel cost as the three cost drivers.  
DLRs and consumables are defined the same as for aircraft.  Personnel costs for this 
model include both active duty and civilian costs.  The AFCAIG model data is obtained 
from two sources for the wing level.  The first is used to develop the AFTOC-AFCAIG 
model, with data from the AFTOC system for the wing and higher levels.  The second 
version uses the same elements, but the data is obtained from the SMEs from the wing 
and lower levels.  The two versions overlap at the wing level, providing two comparative 
data points for an AFCAIG based wing CPAH.  The AFTOC-AFCAIG model uses actual 
gross obligations from the AFTOC tool to obtain personnel costs for the WS, command, 
and wing.  The personnel cost in the SME-AFCAIG model are based on personal 
interviews and localized documentation to determine the number of personnel authorized 
for the wing, squadron, flight, and LF levels.     
 ICBM data are comprised of about a dozen Program Element Codes (PECs) and 
hundreds of Element of Expense/Investment Code (EEICs) to track costs.  For the 
localized data, PEC 11213F was used (see Appendix E for PEC descriptions).  The 
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AFTOC system combines all the associated PECs and provides a slightly more 
comprehensive picture.  Figure 12 shows that PEC 11213F is by far associated with the 
largest portion of ICBM costs.  Therefore, localized data showing only 11213F does not 
include every ICBM cost, but is within 2% of the total costs.  
 
Figure 12: PEC Comparison (AFTOC, 2012). 
The operating costs of a missile squadron, MAF, and LF are largely adapted from 
a 2011 Malmstrom missile-squadron reduction study.  The study looks at variable costs 
that would likely be eliminated if one squadron were deactivated.  A similar study was 
conducted in 2005; the 2005 then year dollars were converted to FY11 values with DOD 
Inflation Tables.  The researcher integrated the local studies with the AFCAIG model to 
determine a cost per alert hour for a LF, MAF, and squadron.  This thesis utilizes the 
AFCAIG and OSD CAIG basic models; however, it does not, complete the OSD CAIG 
process as shown in Figure 13.  Currently, ICBMs are not part of the OSD CAIG or 
AFCAIG processes for determining a CPFH (or CPAH) metric.   
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Figure 13: CAIG Preparation Process (OSD, 1992). 
 
OSD CAIG CPAH Model 
The OSD CAIG model is more inclusive than the AFCAIG model.  Data for the 
OSD Model are divided into 6 elements listed below.  
1. Unit Personnel 
2. Unit Operations 
3. Maintenance 
4. Sustaining Support 
5. Continuing System Improvements  
6. Indirect Support 
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Figure 14: OSD CAIG Operating Cost Model 
 
 
Figure 15: OSD CAIG Ownership Cost Model 
Figures 14 and 15 show the OSD CAIG operating and ownership CPAH models.  
Figure 6 shows what elements are added to each model and how the AFCAIG and OSD 
CAIG models relate to one another.  In addition to the standard reports used to assess 
costs, Mr. Billy Kirby from the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Central Asset 
Management (CAM) office accessed in-depth supply costs from the AFTOC system for 
the weapon system for comparison to the standard reports.  The supply data shows 
charges for what items are purchased and credits for items returned.  Each transaction 
includes the MDS, location (down to the base level) and time period.  The AFTOC 
supply data also contains numerous financial identifiers to narrow the scope of 
transactions included in the queries.  For this comparison, the focus is on Budget Codes 8 
and 9 for PEC 11213F.  There are more than 20 PECs associated with the installations 
that house the ICBMs.  Many of the PECs are historical and only used to show credit for 
an item no longer in use.  Other PECs identify items purchased for tenant units.  The PEC 
11213F accounts for 98% of the total cost and is the focus of the lower-level analysis; a 
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description of the PEC is below.  Descriptions of other PECs used are presented in 
Appendix E. 
Minuteman Squadrons: This program element supports the operation and 
maintenance of the Minutemen weapon system.  It supports missile 
modifications to include Guidance Replacement and Propulsion 
Replacement Programs.  The PE includes manpower authorizations, 
peculiar and support equipment, necessary facilities and the associated 
costs specifically identified and measurable to the Minuteman weapon 
system.  Includes: wing headquarters, missile squadrons, missile 
maintenance, munitions maintenance and weapon system security.  
Excludes: nuclear warhead component costs which are handled by the 
Department of Energy and dedicated intrasite communications.  
(AFCAIG, 2010) 
 
The data from the AFTOC system are also compared with data from the ICBM 
system program office (SPO) for depot related costs.  The first appropriation code this 
analysis considers at the depot is from the FY11 priority buy (PB) Position 3020.  When 
it is added to the O&M cost (3400), it matches the AFTOC figures for DLR costs.  
However, the cost from Automated Budget Interactive Data Environment System 
(ABIDES) Position 3600, for research and development (R&D), is not included in the 
lowest three layers of the OSD CAIG model.  It is added last to calculate the total weapon 
system Ownership Cost (see Figure 15).  The R&D costs are significant, totaling 
$135,140,000; yet if they are distributed across the weapon system’s yearly alert hours, 
they represent only a $34.00 increase per alert hour.  
Comprehensive Model 
 The OSD CAIG model is a robust model, giving a good picture of costs incurred 
by a particular WS.  The ability of AFTOC to provide installation indirect costs and the 
ICBMs’ unique structure allows an additional analysis that is more subjective yet could 
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prove beneficial when trying to understand all costs associated with the weapon system.  
As described in Chapter I, the LGM-30 is a component of the larger WS-133A/M 
including airborne launch control centers (ALCC), EC-135s, MILSTAR satellites, etc 
(see Figure 2).  Moreover, the ICBMs are stationary and have a large indirect support 
footprint covering thousands of square miles.  The indirect costs incurred by a WS are 
harder to quantify than the direct cost captured in the AFTOC system.  For example, a 
satellite that supports the LGM-30 will also support many other weapons systems.  Some 
indirect cost can be divided based on percentage of use, but others are harder to divide.  
Therefore, this analysis uses the Indirect Costs Summary Report data provided by the 
AFTOC system for each of the ICBM MWs.  The indirect costs include base operating 
and support items that are assumed to be independent of the weapon system but necessary 
for a mission to occur at a given location.  Some indirect costs include base housing, real 
property costs, medical costs, and utilities maintenance.  For the 90th MW and the 341st 
MW, where there is only one major weapon system on the installation; the indirect costs 
for the base can be largely attributed to the LGM-30.  Although, there is a likely a slight 
overlap with some of the tenant units.  For the 91st MW at Minot AFB, the indirect costs 
are divided between other wings on the same installation by the AFTOC system.  When 
the attributed indirect cost are added to the ownership costs of the OSD CAIG model, a 
comprehensive costs is derived (see Figure 16).  The results for each model are discussed 
in Chapter IV.   
 
Figure 16: Comprehensive Model 
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Summary 
This chapter describes the elements used to develop three models for assessing 
ICBM CPAH factors.  The first model is adapted from the AFCAIG model and includes 
DLRs, consumables, and personnel costs.  The second model is based on the OSD CAIG 
structure and provides ICBM operating cost and ownership cost.  The final model is more 
subjective and incorporates the unique support structure of the ICBMs.  The final model 
can provide a comprehensive cost consideration of the ICBM CPAH.   
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
The data analysis seeks to determine how the Air Force Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (AFCAIG) and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis 
Group (OSD CAIG), and Comprehensive models can be used to determine an LGM-30 
cost per alert hour (CPAH).  It is not organized to assess the models’ power as 
proportional predictive models.  However, given the described structure of the 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, it is necessary to consider the fixed costs 
when accurately describing the CPAH.  The CPAH appear to follow a step function 
based on the level of management for each echelon.  Table 8 shows how each level of 
management has distinct changes in CPAH.  The presented analysis emphasizes the step 
function and the relation of fixed costs to prevent any misconceptions about 
proportionality among model comparisons.  A more apt view of the data could be to 
consider it a cost per LGM-30 echelon (flight, squadron, etc.) rather than a CPAH (see 
Table 8).   
AFCAIG Model Results 
First, data for the AFCAIG based model are presented.  All costs are compared 
using fiscal year 2011 (FY11) values.  Historical figures have been converted from then 
year dollars to FY11 dollars to account for inflation.  The wing-level AFCAIG data is 
collected from both local interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) (shown in Table 
5) and the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) (shown in Table 6).  The data for 
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the consumables and personnel cost are acquired from the base –level SMEs, while the 
shaded data is based on data provided by the ICBM system program office (SPO) for 
DLRs.   
Table 5: AFCAIG, SME CPAH Results 
  Wing Squadron Flight (MAF) Missile (LF) 
DLR  $     3,636,875   $   1,212,292   $    242,458   $    24,246  
CONs  $   18,062,296   $   5,066,808   $ 1,983,260   $    61,124  
Personnel  $ 154,166,467   $   9,902,356   $    754,808   $      5,737  
Total Assessed Cost  $ 175,865,638   $16,181,456   $ 2,980,526   $    91,107  
Alert Hours  $     1,314,000   $      438,000   $      87,600   $      8,760  
CPAH  $                134   $                37  $              34   $           10  
 
The depot level reparable (DLR) and consumable cost drivers are very close to 
each other, within 5% each.  However, the personnel costs are significantly different, 
with about 38% difference in the data obtained from AFTOC system and the base-level 
SMEs.  The reason for the personnel cost-disparity is that the lower-level costs are based 
on authorizations multiplied by the DOD-AF active duty composite rates.  The AFTOC 
personnel values are not solely based on authorizations, but on actual costs incurred.  
Given that the wings and squadrons are not fully manned, it is expected that costs based 
on authorizations will be greater than the actual costs incurred (Lara, 2012).  The 
disparity affects the data obtained from the base level for the wing and squadron 
personnel costs.  However, the data for the launch facilities (LFs) and flights or missile 
alert facilities (MAFs) provides an accurate portrayal of personnel costs because the LF 
and MAF teams are set sizes and the personnel costs are stable.  
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Table 6: AFCAIG, AFTOC CPAH Results 
  LGM-30 AFGSC Wing 
DLR  $         10,910,625   $          10,437,648   $             3,636,875  
CONs  $         97,601,809   $          97,580,167   $           12,350,229  
Personnel  $      459,298,121   $        440,878,762   $         135,307,896  
Total Assessed Cost  $      567,810,555  $        548,896,577   $         151,294,999  
Alert Hours  $           3,942,000  $             3,942,000   $             1,314,000  
CPAH  $                      144  $                        139   $                        115  
 
As shown in Chapter II, there are many factors that can actually increase costs 
when a LF is down for maintenance or other reasons.  Therefore, the likelihood of saving 
$10.40 for every hour that a missile is off-alert is negligible.  Rather, the value of the 
metric is to highlight the smallness of the marginal CPAH per missile.  Both sets of data, 
and results, include the wing level CPAH.  Table 5 shows the AFCAIG SME CPAH  
results for the wing, squadron, MAF and LF, while Table 6 contains the AFCAIG 
AFTOC CPAH results for AFGSC, the weapon system, and the wing.  The CPAH values 
for the wing level can be contrasted a third time with the OSD CAIG based model shown 
in Table 7.   
OSD CAIG Model Results 
The OSD CAIG-based model derives a CPAH for the WS, AFGSC, and wing 
echelons.  All the data for the six elements of the OSD CAIG model comes from the 
AFTOC system.  The modification costs were provided by the ICBM SPO and were 
verified with the AFTOC values.  The figures under the heading Operating include all the 
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OSD items included in Figure 2 and Appendix C.  The OSD CAIG total Ownership Cost 
includes all the items comprising the LGM-30 Operating cost plus modification cost, for 
a total of $328.   
Table 7: OSD CAIG CPAH 
OSD CAIG Elements  
 LGM-30   AFGSC   Wing  
  Ownership    Operating    Operating    Operating   
 1.0 Unit Personnel   $     420,509,716  $ 420,509,716   $ 403,999,241   $ 135,307,896  
 2.0 Unit Operations   $       46,368,719  $    46,368,719  $    59,530,962  $      7,797,141  
 3.0 Maintenance   $     306,843,120  $ 306,843,120   $                      -     $      4,553,088  
 4.0 Sustaining Support   $       21,585,028  $    21,585,028  $      7,971,981  $                      -    
 5.0 Cont Systm Improv.  $     103,828,658  $ 103,828,658   $      1,850,705  $                      -    
 6.0 Indirect Support   $       49,124,926  $    49,124,926  $    48,887,526  $    11,578,767  
 Modification Cost   $     343,956,000  
 
    
 Total Assessed Cost   $ 1,292,216,167   $ 948,260,167   $ 522,240,415   $ 159,236,891  
 Alert Hours              3,942,000          3,942,000          3,942,000          1,314,000  
 CPAH   $                    328   $                 241  $                 132  $                 121  
Comprehensive Model Results 
The Comprehensive model includes all the costs of the OSD CAIG Ownership 
Costs plus the indirect costs for the associated installation.  The indirect costs almost 
double the costs at each echelon.  A necessary caveat to the Comprehensive model’s 
results is that the indirect costs are not directly attributable to the weapon system.  Rather, 
the indirect costs are associated with the location of the weapon system.  The indirect 
costs for the wing in Table 8 are the indirect cost for Malmstrom AFB.  The indirect costs 
for AFGSC include the indirect cost from Malmstrom AFB, F.E. Warren AFB, and the 
91st MW at Minot AFB.  The data for Malmstrom AFB and F.E. Warren AFB capture 
indirect costs that include most base-operating costs including items like facility support 
and medical operations.  However, the figure for the 91st MW is only a percentage of 
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total installation indirect costs.  The percentage varies for each item and is determined by 
AFTOC.  The total 91st MW indirect costs account for about 1% of the total indirect 
costs at Minot.  The majority of the indirect costs for Minot are assigned to the 5th 
Bomber Wing (BW) by the AFTOC tool.  The Comprehensive model costs provide a 
broader perspective of the total costs DOD incurs each hour to operate the LGM-30.  
However, it is emphasized that the values reflected in the Comprehensive model reflect 
many costs that would remain if the ICBM mission were to cease at those installations.  
For example, a large percentage of the personnel would likely be transferred to other 
missions and continue to be an expense to the DOD.  Appendix C contains tables 
showing the comparative results of the OSD CAIG Operating and Ownership CPAH 
results to the Comprehensive CPAH results. 
Table 8: Comprehensive CPAH 
OSD CAIG Elements LGM-30* AFGSC Wing 
1.0 Unit Personnel  $         680,391,818   $       660,697,776   $    154,166,467  
2.0 Unit Operations  $         142,175,907   $       155,316,508   $      13,209,287  
3.0 Maintenance  $         308,637,741   $            1,794,621   $         4,853,010  
4.0 Sustaining Support  $           23,789,427   $          10,176,380   $                        -    
5.0 Continuing Sys Improv.  $         103,829,958   $            1,852,005   $                        -    
6.0 Indirect Support  $         870,368,190   $       866,879,679   $    140,485,240  
Modification Cost  $         343,956,000      
Total Assessed Cost  $     2,473,149,042   $    1,696,716,969   $    312,714,003  
Alert Hours 3,942,000 3,942,000 1314000 
CPAH  $                   627.38   $                  430.42   $               237.99  
 
45 
Investigative Questions Answered 
1. Can the AFCAIG and OSD CAIG aircraft CPFH models be used to develop a 
CPAH model for the LGM-30 weapon system?  If so, what are the 
differences? 
This thesis presents two models already in use by the Air Force.  The AFCAIG 
model is used by modifying the cost drivers to fit the unique aspects of the Minuteman 
III.  It incorporates two of the three drivers from the CPFH model: DLRs and 
consumables, including GPC items.  The third CPFH driver, aviation fuel, is replaced 
with personnel costs to acquire a CPAH metric.  The OSD CAIG model is used for the 
LGM-30 without any manual modification.  The modifications occur in the internal 
workings of the AFTOC system.  For example, the AFTOC system includes “range 
support” in item 6.7 for the aircraft OSD CAIG totals, but includes “cost of supporting 
live fire of missiles” for missile OSD CAIG item 6.7.    
2. Do the cost per alert hour factors change significantly based on the level of 
management?  
The CPAH values of the AFCAIG model do increase disproportionally with each 
level of management, but not as drastically as the OSD CAIG model or comprehensive 
models (see Table 9).  The AFCAIG model includes fewer cost drivers than the other two 
models, likely contributing to it monotonically increasing over the echelons.  
Additionally, the drivers not part of the AFCAIG model are the most varied costs of the 
weapon system.  The steadiness of the AFCAIG drivers is emphasized in the comparison 
between the wing, AFGSC, and weapon system AFCAIG CPAH figures (see Table 6).  
The AFGSC and weapon system CPAH figures only increase by 20% and 3% 
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respectively from the previous (lower) level of management.  Conversely, the OSD CAIG 
CPAH figures for the weapon system and AFGSC increase by 80% and 46% respectively 
from the next lower level of management.  This results because the three AFCAIG 
drivers are mainly spent at the base level.  However, the OSD CAIG drivers include 
items (e.g. contractor support) that are spent largely at the higher levels of management.  
The OSD CAIG and Comprehensive models do not have the needed fidelity to 
distinguish cost below the wing level, thus a comparison is only presented down to the 
base level.   
 
Table 9: Echelon CPAH Comparison 
  LGM-30G  AFGSC  Wing Squadron 
Flight 
(MAF) 
Missile 
(LF) 
AFCAIG CPAH  $ 144.04   $ 139.24   $ 115.14   $     36.94   $  34.02   $10.40  
OSD CAIG CPAH  $ 327.81   $ 132.48   $ 121.18  
  Comprehensive   $ 627.38   $ 430.42   $ 237.99  
 
3. What cost drivers should be included in developing a comprehensive CPAH 
model for the LGM-30 weapon system? 
The drivers for the AFCAIG model are selected based on their portion of impact 
on the total weapon system costs.  Three elements are desired based on the three elements 
of the accepted AFCAIG model.  Nonetheless, this analysis could have included more or 
fewer AFCAIG drivers as fitting.  The three factors of the AFCAIG CPAH model 
account for the three largest portions of the available weapon system drivers.  The main 
diversion of the traditional CPFH model is replacing aviation fuel with personnel costs.  
This change is made because fuel, POL, and electricity account for .5% of the total 
weapon system cost, while personnel account for 46.5% of the weapon system costs.  The 
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cost drivers for the OSD CAIG model are not modified for this analysis.  Appendix B 
provides an expanded list of the OSD CAIG drivers.  
4. What is the expected relationship of costs and alert hours? 
The relationship of costs and alert hours is presented in multiple formats to 
provide readers with the broadest perspective of how a CPAH metric can be utilized.  
Some applications will benefit from using the AFCAIG model.  The AFCAIG model 
provides the most commonly adapted model for predictive metrics.  The OSD CAIG 
model provides an in-depth analysis from data that is accessible to AFTOC users and 
regularly updated.  The Comprehensive model provides decision makers an analysis of 
how much money is likely to be affected by decisions that affect an entire level of 
management.  Further recommendations on applications for the models are presented in 
Chapter V.  Finally, this analysis shows how the CPAH metrics are not proportional.  
One less alert hour will not directly reduce the bottom line proportionally to the CPAH 
figures from the models.  This relationship is observable in the vast differences between a 
marginal costs of $10.40 for one missile and a Comprehensive costs (including all the 
weapon system direct and indirect support) of $627.38 shown Table 9.  The ICBMs are 
not turned on and off by the hour and the fixed costs associated with operating the 
weapon system are very large.  Thus, if only one ICBM is on alert, the costs will not be 
the marginal $10.40 per hour.  Considering the fixed costs is imperative for accurate 
strategic-level decisions.   
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Summary 
Chapter IV includes the results from the three models developed and analyzed.  
The analysis shows how the models are used to develop multiple perspectives for a 
CPAH metric.  The models are not developed as proportional predictive models.  This 
chapter shows how each level of management generates distinct changes in the CPAH.  
The model emphasizes the step function and the relation of fixed costs to provide an 
accurate assessment for decision makers.  Finally, each model has strengths and 
weaknesses for decision makers; Chapter V presents the recommended uses of each 
model.  
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V.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the concluding remarks and recommendations for further 
research.  The analysis presented in this thesis is the result of both census data for the 
entire weapon system and survey data acquired from the base level.  Together, the data 
provide a wide swath of analysis, but do not go in depth at any one echelon.  Much could 
be gained from looking at only one level in greater detail.  A goal of this thesis was to 
provide the sponsor and other interested parties with a broad overview of ICBM-costs 
drivers.  This broad perspective will allow future analysts, and decision makers, to make 
informed decisions regarding follow-on studies.  Below are recommendations from this 
researcher based on experience gained during this study.   
Recommendations for Model Use 
Each model has strengths and weaknesses for given situations.  The best model is 
determined by the decision makers’ needs and acceptable assumptions.  First, the 
AFCAIG model is weakened by limiting the elements considered.  It is based on the cost 
assessments for flying missions from the 1960s, when less data was readily available.  
Today, the robust capabilities of the AFTOC system render limiting of considered factors 
of the AFCAIG model unnecessary.  Nonetheless, it is still the most widely accepted 
model in the Air Force flying community.  Therefore, it is best suited for comparisons to 
the larger Air Force. 
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The OSD CAIG model requires more data and involves more factors for 
consideration.  The capability of the AFTOC system to synthesize all of the needed 
elements mitigates what would have been impossibly daunting using only the Air Force’s 
legacy systems.  The readily accessible data set in the AFTOC system makes the OSD 
CAIG model an informative tool for considering the cost directly attributable to the 
weapon system.  Therefore, it is best suited for the decision makers in the ICBM 
community. 
Lastly, the Comprehensive model’s main weakness is the assumptions about what 
happens to the resources if a mission ceases.  The Comprehensive model includes the 
support items for the ICBM installations.  If the ICBM mission were to cease at that 
location, not all the costs would be eliminated.  Likely, many of the resources would 
cross-flow where possible and some may be put into long-term storage.  The complex 
endeavor of deactivating an entire installation would require further analysis beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  However, the Comprehensive model does provide insight about the 
total costs the ICBM enterprise incurs to operate.  This model is most applicable to 
strategic-level decision makers.   
Recommendations for Action 
The researcher came across a few items that are worthy of deeper focus in future 
studies.  One such item would be to determine why the 91st MW is only assigned 1% of 
the indirect costs at Minot.  It may be that the MW consumes significantly fewer 
resources than the 5th BW, but the actual percentage should be verified.  Further analysis 
of other percentages of indirect costs at each base are worthy of more analysis.  This 
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thesis is unclassified, which limits some of the analysis of how future options could affect 
indirect costs.  However, it would be beneficial to determine if there is a plan (and what it 
is) for directing resources if any echelon of the WS is deactivated.  For example, what 
percentage of personnel would be affected if a LF, MAF, squadron, or wing were 
eliminated?  In addition, would the personnel be reassigned within the enterprise, 
reassigned to another weapon system, or eliminated?  In addition to the personnel driver, 
assigning indirect costs can also be affected by the intended use of a base if the mission is 
changed.  If an installation receives a new mission in place of the ICBM mission, then the 
installation-indirect costs will no longer be associated with the WS-133A/M, but will still 
be a real cost to the DOD.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Future research can expand this model by developing a predictive model for 
CPAH.  The current analysis is based on FY11 values.  This analysis does not identify 
what the expected CPAH will be in future years.  Developing a predictive model is a 
challenging proposal, but could be very useful to decision makers.  In the course of 
collecting data for this thesis, the researcher was provided a chart similar to Figure 18 
below.  The figure shows the O&M and active duty personnel appropriated funds for the 
LGM-30G; the data is from PEC 11213F.  All dollar values are adjusted from “then year 
dollars” to FY11 dollars.  The graph shows how the selected cost drivers have been 
increasing most years.  As this thesis shows, there are other cost drivers that may paint a 
more accurate picture.  Figure 19, includes the same cost drivers as Figure 18 along with 
research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement costs.  All 
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four elements together comprise the total appropriated funds for the weapon system.  
When all the drivers are chosen, a very different trend emerges.  Thus, future research 
would need to analyze carefully which drivers best predict total WS costs for future 
years.   
 
Figure 17: LGM-30 O&M and Personnel Appropriations Summary (in millions) 
(AFTOC, 2012) 
 
Figure 18: LGM-30 Appropriations Summary (in millions) (AFTOC, 2012) 
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Another element to consider in future research would be a variable accounting for 
the average age of the ICBM and/or ICBM selected components.  As stated in the 
literature review, systems experience higher failure rates as they age.  The accuracy of 
predicting future CPAHs will be increased if the model is able to account for the 
expected increase in failures based on age, year over year.  Additionally, a predictive 
model could include the number of maintenance visits per LF as a variable.  Many of the 
cost associated with operating the ICBMs are fixed; however, the largest variable portion 
is related to maintenance actions.  
Summary 
This chapter provides the researchers final remarks and recommendations for 
future analyses.  This thesis presents both AF level data and data obtained from 
interviews with SMEs.  The result is a broad analysis across each level of management 
for the Minuteman III.  This wide-ranging perspective prepares the field for future 
researchers and decision makers to conduct more in-depth follow-on studies.  The results 
of this study, along with future studies, will continue to improve our stewardship of the 
ICBM nuclear component.  
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Appendix A: Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ABIDES 
Automated Budget Interactive Data 
Environment System 
AF Air Force 
AFB Air Force Base 
AFCIAG  Air Force Cost Improvement Group 
AFGSC Air Force Global Strike Command 
AFTOC Air Force Total Ownership Cost 
BW Bomber Wing 
CAPE Cost Analysis Program Evaluation 
CPAH Cost-per-[missile] alert-hour 
CPFH Cost-per-flying-hour 
DLR Depot Level Reparables 
EEIC Element of Expense/Investment Code 
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
IPIC ICBM Prime Integration Contract 
LF Launch Facility (Single Minuteman III) 
LGM-30 Nomenclature for Minuteman III  
MAF Missile Alert Facility (Missile Flight) 
MM III Minuteman III ICBM 
MW Missile Wing 
OSD CAIG 
Office of Secretary of Defense Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group 
PEC Program Element Code 
WS Weapon System 
WS-133A/M 
Nomenclature for entire Minuteman III 
weapon system and peripheral systems 
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Appendix B: AFCAIG (CAPE) Missile  
Operating and Support Cost Element Structure 
 
1.0     MISSION PERSONNEL  
    1.1    OPERATIONS  
    1.2     MAINTENANCE  
    1.3    OTHER MISSION PERSONNEL  
2.0     UNIT-LEVEL CONSUMPTION  
    2.1    POL/ENERGY CONSUMPTION  
    2.2    CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS  
    2.3    DEPOT-LEVEL REPARABLES  
    2.4    TRAINING MUNITIONS/EXPENDABLE STORES  
    2.5    OTHER  
3.0     INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE (EXTERNAL TO UNIT)  
    3.1    MAINTENANCE  
    3.2     CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS  
    3.3    OTHER  
4.0     DEPOT MAINTENANCE  
    4.1    OVERHAUL/REWORK  
    4.2     OTHER  
5.0     CONTRACTOR SUPPORT  
    5.1    INTERIM CONTRACTOR SUPPORT  
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    5.2    CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT  
    5.3    OTHER  
6.0     SUSTAINING SUPPORT  
    6.1    SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT  
    6.2    MODIFICATION KIT PROCUREMENT/INSTALLATION  
    6.3    OTHER RECURRING INVESTMENT  
    6.4    SUSTAINING ENGINEERING SUPPORT  
    6.5    SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT  
    6.6    SIMULATOR OPERATIONS  
    6.7    AIR SUPPORT  
    6.8    OTHER  
7.0     INDIRECT SUPPORT  
    7.1    PERSONNEL SUPPORT  
    7.2    INSTALLATION SUPPORT  
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Appendix C: OSD CAIG Based Model Details 
 
Comprehensive  Ownership Operating  Indirect
CPA 15,057 7,867 5,773 7,190
CPAH 627 328 241 300
Alert Hours 3,942,000 3,942,000 3,942,000 3,942,000
Total Assessed Cost 2,473,149,042 1,292,216,167 948,260,167 1,180,932,875
Modification Cost 343,956,000 343,956,000
1.0 Unit Personnel 680,391,818 420,509,716 420,509,716 259,882,102
2.0 Unit Operations 142,175,907 46,368,719 46,368,719 95,807,188
3.0 Maintenance 308,637,741 306,843,120 306,843,120 1,794,621
4.0 Sustaining Support 23,789,427 21,585,028 21,585,028 2,204,399
5.0 Continuing System Improvements 103,829,958 103,828,658 103,828,658 1,300
6.0 Indirect Support 870,368,190 49,124,926 49,124,926 821,243,264
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Comp. Operating  Indirect Comp. Operating  Indirect
CPA 10,330 3,180 7,151 5,712 2,908 2,803
CPAH 430 132 298 238 121 117
Alert Hours 3,942,000 3,942,000 3,942,000 1314000 1314000 1314000
Total Assessed Cost 1,696,716,969 522,240,415 1,174,476,554 312,714,003 159,236,891 153,477,113
Modification Cost
1.0 Unit Personnel 660,697,776 403,999,241 256,698,535 154,166,467 135,307,896 18,858,572
2.0 Unit Operations 155,316,508 59,530,962 95,785,546 13,209,287 7,797,141 5,412,146
3.0 Maintenance 1,794,621 0 1,794,621 4,853,010 4,553,088 299,922
4.0 Sustaining Support 10,176,380 7,971,981 2,204,399 0 0 0
5.0 Continuing Sys Impmts 1,852,005 1,850,705 1,300 0 0 0
6.0 Indirect Support 866,879,679 48,887,526 817,992,153 140,485,240 11,578,767 128,906,473
AFGSC Wing (Malmstrom)
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Appendix D: Minuteman III Description (USAF, LGM-30 Factsheet) 
Mission 
The LGM-30G Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, is an 
element of the nation's strategic deterrent forces under the control of the Air Force Global 
Strike Command. The "L" in LGM is the Department of Defense designation for silo-
launched; "G" means surface attack; and "M" stands for guided missile. 
Features 
The Minuteman is a strategic weapon system using a ballistic missile of 
intercontinental range. Missiles are dispersed in hardened silos to protect against attack 
and connected to an underground launch control center through a system of hardened 
cables. Launch crews, consisting of two officers, perform around-the-clock alert in the 
launch control center. 
A variety of communication systems provide the president and secretary of 
defense with highly reliable, virtually instantaneous direct contact with each launch crew. 
Should command capability be lost between the launch control center and remote missile 
launch facilities, specially configured E-6B airborne launch control center aircraft 
automatically assume command and control of the isolated missile or missiles. Fully 
qualified airborne missile combat crews aboard airborne launch control center aircraft 
would execute the president's orders. 
An extensive life extension program is underway to keep the remaining missiles 
safe, secure and reliable well into the 21st century. These major programs include: 
remanufacture of the solid-propellant rocket motors, replacement of standby power 
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systems, repair of launch facilities, and installation of updated, survivable 
communications equipment and additional security enhancements. 
Background 
The Minuteman weapon system was conceived in the late 1950s and Minuteman I 
was deployed in the early 1960s. Minuteman was a revolutionary concept and an 
extraordinary technical achievement. Both the missile and basing components 
incorporated significant advances beyond the relatively slow-reacting, liquid-fueled, 
remotely-controlled intercontinental ballistic missiles of the previous generation. From 
the beginning, Minuteman missiles have provided a quick-reacting, inertially guided, 
highly survivable component to America's strategic deterrent program. Minuteman's 
maintenance concept capitalizes on high reliability and a "remove and replace" approach 
to achieve a near 100 percent alert rate. 
Through state-of-the-art improvements, the Minuteman system has evolved to 
meet new challenges and assume new missions. Modernization programs have resulted in 
new versions of the missile, expanded targeting options, improved accuracy and 
survivability. Today's Minuteman weapon system is the product of almost 40 years of 
continuous enhancement. 
The current Minuteman force consists of 450 Minuteman III's located at  the 90th 
Missile Wing at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyo.; the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB, 
Mont.; and the 91st Missile at Minot AFB, N.D. 
General Characteristics 
Primary Function: Intercontinental ballistic missile 
Contractor: Boeing Co. 
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Power Plant: Three solid-propellant rocket motors; first stage - Thiokol; second stage - 
Aerojet-General; third stage - United Technologies Chemical Systems Division 
Thrust: First stage, 202,600 pounds  
Length: 59.9 feet (18 meters) 
Weight: 79,432 pounds (36,030 kilograms) 
Diameter: 5.5 feet (1.67 meters) 
Range: 6,000-plus miles (5,218 nautical miles) 
Speed: Approximately 15,000 mph (Mach 23 or 24,000 kph) at burnout 
Ceiling: 700 miles (1,120 kilometers) 
Date deployed: June 1970, production cessation: December 1978 
Inventory: Active force, 450; Reserve, 0; ANG, 0
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Appendix E: Program Element Codes Used 
PE 
(AF - 6 
Digit) 
Title Description 
11198F Management 
HQ-Global Strike 
Command 
(AFGSC) 
Includes manpower authorizations, peculiar and support 
equipment, necessary facilities and the associated costs 
specifically identified and measurable to the following: 
Global Strike Command (GSC); HQ 8th Air Force; 
Excludes non-management headquarters resources 
WWMCCS ADP. 
11213F MINUTEMAN 
Squadrons 
Minuteman Squadrons: This program element supports the 
operation and maintenance of the Minutemen weapon 
system. It supports missile modifications to include 
Guidance Replacement and Propulsion Replacement 
Programs. The PE includes manpower authorizations, 
peculiar and support equipment, necessary facilities and the 
associated costs specifically identified and measurable to 
the Minuteman weapon system. Includes: wing 
headquarters, missile squadrons, missile maintenance, 
munitions maintenance and weapon system security. 
Excludes: nuclear warhead component costs which are 
handled by the Department of Energy and dedicated 
intrasite communications. 
11215F PEACEKEEPER 
Squadrons 
Peacekeeper Squadrons: Includes manpower 
authorizations, peculiar and support equipment, necessary 
facilities and the associated costs specifically identified and 
measurable to the Peacekeeper weapon system (Minuteman 
silos basing mode). Includes Wing Headquarters, Missile 
Squadrons, Missile Maintenance, Munitions Maintenance, 
Missile Site Support Aircraft, Weapons System Security, 
and weapons system acquisition costs. Excludes advanced 
missile training, nuclear warhead component costs which 
are borne by Atomic Energy Commission and missile site 
support. 
11235F ICBM Helicopter 
Support 
ICBM Helicopter Support: Funds operational costs for 
ICBM helicopter support required by nuclear weapon 
system safety rules for convoy movements. Provides 
essential equipment, crew manpower, and flying hours for 
commanders to run day-to-day maintenance and operation 
of these MAC operated helicopters in support of SACs 
ICBM fleet. 
62 
11321F Special Purpose 
Communications 
Special Purpose Communications: Includes manpower 
authorizations, peculiar and support equipment, necessary 
facilities and the associated costs specifically identified and 
measurable to the following: Air Force Low Frequency 
System (487L) Transmitters Receivers at Northern Area 
UHF Sites, Minuteman and Titan Missile Sites, Wing 
Command Posts, and COC Communications Squadrons 
Excludes resources identified to the airborne command 
posts (see PACCS elements in this program and Programs 
2 and 3). 
11323F MINUTEMAN 
Communications 
Minuteman Communications: Includes the non-DCS 
procurement, construction, and operations resources 
required to support the ICBM Minuteman Squadrons (PE 
0101213F)and the communications resources required to 
support the administrative, logistic, and launch/status 
functions. Additionally, this program element includes the 
intersite and intrasite communications resources required to 
support the command control function. Excludes 
communications resources integral to the weapons system 
which are designed for and delivered with and as a part of 
the missile complex, and whose costs are normally 
included in the cost of the weapons system. 
11879F Facilities 
Operations - 
Offensive 
Facilities Operations - Offensive: Includes manpower 
authorizations, peculiar and support equipment, necessary 
facilities, contracts, and associated costs to plan, manage, 
and execute these functions: Fire prevention and protection 
including crash rescue, emergency response, and disaster 
preparedness, engineering readiness including explosive 
ordnance disposal, and Prime BEEF forces, utilities to 
include plant operation and purchase of commodity, refuse 
collection and disposal to include recycling operations, 
pavement clearance including snow and ice removal from 
roads, and airfields, lease costs for installation real property 
including off-base facilities, grounds maintenance and 
landscaping, real property special inspections of facilities 
and master planning, pest control, and custodial services. 
Excludes sustainment, restoration, and modernization of 
facilities, other environmental services (such as disposal of 
hazardous materials), and mission-funded contingency 
costs which are funded elsewhere. The title of this PE was 
changed from Real Property Services. 
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11978F Facilities 
Sustainment - 
Offensive 
Facilities Sustainment - Offensive: Facilities Sustainment. 
Provides resources for maintenance and repair activities 
necessary to keep facilities in the Departments real 
property inventory in good working order. It includes 
regularly scheduled adjustments and inspections, 
preventive maintenance tasks, and emergency response and 
service calls for minor repairs. It also includes major 
repairs or replacement of facility components (usually 
accomplished by contract) that are expected to occur 
periodically throughout the life cycle of facilities. This 
work includes regular roof replacement, refinishing of wall 
surfaces, repairing and replacement of heating and cooling 
systems, replacing tile and carpeting, and similar types of 
work. It does not include certain restoration, 
modernization, and environmental compliance costs which 
are funded elsewhere. Other tasks associated with facilities 
operations (such as custodial services, grass cutting, 
landscaping, waste disposal, and the provision of central 
utilities) are also not included. This program supports all 
facilities reported in the real property inventory for which 
the Facilities Sustainment Model provides a funding 
requirement estimate, it excludes unreported facilities or 
any other facilities for which the Facilities Sustainment 
Model does not estimate a funding requirement. 
18538F Installation Law 
Enforcement 
Operations -
SAFs 
Installation Law Enforcement Operations - SAFs: Includes 
manpower authorizations, contracts, peculiar and support 
equipment, and associated costs specifically identified and 
measurable to plan, manage, coordinate, and execute 
functions of Installation Law Enforcement (LE) 
Operations. Installation LE Operations includes enforcing 
federal, state and military law, enforcing installation 
guidance, issuance of citations, detaining suspects, motor 
vehicle traffic management, traffic investigations, 
apprehension and restraint of offenders, and crowd control, 
crime prevention, crime detection, LE patrols, LE liaison, 
apprehension of persons who commit crimes on the 
installation, testifying in prosecution cases and temporary 
detention of offenders. This includes protecting, defending, 
and deterring against criminal activities, conduct of minor 
investigations, the development of plans for the 
employment of law enforcement personnel, emergency 
response, and management as it relates to law enforcement 
activities and functions and which includes all processes 
intended to preserve the principles of law through various 
strategies. Excluded are the following functional 
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categories: Facilities Operations (Real Property Services), 
Facilities Sustainment, Facilities Restoration and 
Modernization, and Facilities Demolition/Disposal, which 
are reported under separate PEs. 
18539F Physical Security 
Protection 
Service - SAFs 
Physical Security Protection Service - SAFs: Includes 
manpower authorizations, contracts, peculiar and support 
equipment, and associated costs specifically identified and 
measurable to plan, manage, coordinate, and execute 
functions of Installation Physical Security Protection and 
Services. This includes personnel, procedures and 
equipment measures employed or designed to safeguard 
personnel, facilities and property from loss, destruction, 
espionage, terrorism, or sabotage on the installation, 
prevent unauthorized access to 
facilities/installations/restricted areas, equipment, and 
materials. This includes regulation of people, material, and 
vehicles entering or exiting a designated area, mobile and 
static security activities for the protection of installation or 
government assets, conduct of physical security 
inspections/assessments, construction design review, 
special protection of high value or sensitive property and 
management of installation security systems, plans and 
funding. Excluded are the following functional categories: 
Facilities Operations (Real Property Services), Facilities 
Sustainment, Facilities Restoration and Modernization, and 
Facilities Demolition/Disposal, which are reported under 
separate PEs. 
18542F Transportation 
Logistics - SAFs 
Transportation Logistics - SAFs: Includes manpower 
authorizations, contracts, peculiar and support equipment, 
and associated costs specifically identified and measurable 
to manage and administer the acquisition, dispatch, 
operation (includes arranging for the movement of 
passengers, cargo, and personal property), maintenance, 
and disposal of all non-tactical government owned and 
controlled vehicles and transportation related equipment 
used for the day-to-day support of installation operations. 
This includes, but is not limited to, vehicles (passenger 
carrying, special purpose and general purpose) and 
equipment such as railway equipment, portable generators 
(not supplying facility back-up power), mobile cranes, 
material-handling equipment, construction equipment, civil 
engineering support equipment, contractual transportation 
equipment, such as contractual bus services, vehicle 
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leasing, and other transportation services. This does not 
include those vehicles and equipment used in direct 
connection with or in support of combat or tactical 
operations. This includes Installation Movement 
operational activities to include deployment, sustainment 
(resupply), redeployment, passenger services, passenger 
terminal and cargo handling operations to include airfield 
arrival/departure, personal property movement, Privately 
Owned Vehicles (POVs), mobile homes, and movement of 
freight. Excluded are the following functional categories: 
Facilities Operations (Real Property Services), Facilities 
Sustainment, Facilities Restoration and Modernization, and 
Facilities Demolition/Disposal, which are reported under 
separate PEs. 
18550F IT Services 
Management - 
Offensive 
IT Services Management - Offensive: Includes manpower 
authorizations, contracts, peculiar and support equipment, 
and associated costs specifically identified and measurable 
to plan, manage, coordinate, and execute Information 
Technology Services Management (ITSM). Includes the 
delivery of services consisting of secure and non-secure 
fixed voice communications, wireless voice, data and video 
connectivity services, video conferencing services 
(excludes desktop video teleconferencing (VTC) 
Collaboration). Provides infrastructure support, including 
the design, installation, and maintenance of special 
circuits/systems in support of life safety/security systems 
and monitoring/control systems. Provides Collaboration 
and Messaging Services including services and tools for 
workforce to communicate and share information). 
Provides Application and Web-hosting including operation 
and management services required to support web and 
application hosting. Provides for IT Operations Centers 
including systems and processes necessary to allow 
customers to have seamless access to IT applications and 
solutions. Provides Desktop Management Support 
including management and support for end-user hardware 
and software services and tools. Includes Service Desk 
Support, Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Disaster 
Recovery support, requirements and training for common-
user software applications, Information Assurance, and 
Multimedia/Visual Information. Provides printing, 
publication, and duplication services. Excluded are the 
following functional categories: Facilities Operations (Real 
Property Services), Facilities Sustainment, Facilities 
Restoration and Modernization, and Facilities 
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Demolition/Disposal, which are reported under separate 
PEs. 
27588F Air Base Ground 
Defense 
Air Base Ground Defense: This program procures 
equipment and provides for the sustainment of security 
forces (CONUS, OCONUS, and in-place mobility) 
assigned to detect and defeat various threats directed 
against Air Force resources and personnel during 
peacetime contingencies and execution of war plans. The 
personnel and equipment provided by this program 
contribute to the overall Air Force antiterrorism/force 
protection program. It enhances security forces ability to 
provide rapid responses by building more deployable, 
flexible, and sustainable forces capable of operating from 
other than main operating bases to support sustained sortie 
generation and air operations. It directs the procurement of 
advanced technology force multipliers to include: night 
vision and thermal imagery equipment, counter 
sniper/battery capabilities, ground weapons, target 
acquisition radar, interoperable tactical communications, 
wheeled tactical armored vehicles, tactical sensors systems 
and unit/personnel protective field equipment. This 
program protects and defends personnel and other critical 
Air Force resources. 
87700F Defense Medical 
Centers, Station 
Hospitals & 
Medical Clinics - 
CONUS 
Defense Medical Centers, Hospitals, Medical Clinics - 
CONUS - Includes manpower authorizations, peculiar and 
support equipment, necessary facilities and the associated 
costs specifically identified and measurable to the 
following: Resources devoted to the provision of health 
care in DOD-owned and operated CONUS facilities which 
are staffed, and equipped to provide inpatient care for both 
surgical and non-surgical conditions and/or outpatient care 
for non-hospital type patients. Includes medical centers, 
station hospitals, medical clinics, subordinate aid stations, 
resource sharing and resource support agreements, federal 
sharing agreements, medical center laboratories which are 
integral to these facilities, alcohol abuse treatment 
programs conducted at these facilities, clinical 
investigations activities conducted at these activities, and 
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staff support for on-the-job training and education 
programs conducted at these facilities. Excludes 
supplemental care costs specifically identified and 
measurable to health care services received in a non-
defense facility as a result of a referral for authorized 
beneficiaries of the military services. Excludes resources 
associated with the operation of management headquarters 
for regional lead agents, dental clinics, tactical medical 
units (see appropriate elements in Programs 2 and 5) and 
other health care resources devoted exclusively to teaching 
(see appropriate elements in this program). 
32053F NMCS-wide 
Support - 
Communications 
National Military Command System (NMCS)-Wide 
Support - Communications: Includes manpower 
authorizations, peculiar and support equipment, necessary 
facilities and the associated costs specifically identified and 
measurable to the following: Resources in support of the 
National Military Command System as defined in DOD 
Directive 5l05.19 necessary for support of the National 
Military Command System as defined in DOD Directive 
5105.19 necessary for support of multiple facilities of the 
NMCS. This includes leased/government-owned circuitry 
supporting the NMCS which interconnect multiple 
facilities of the NMCS. This includes: ARMY: Automatic 
Message Processing System (AMPS), Secure Data and 
Visual Communication System (SDVCS), Washington 
Area High Speed Facsimile Network (WASHFAX), 
NMCC Message Center (NMCC/MCO), and dedicated 
leased communications circuits and equipment for the 
above. AIR FORCE: EMATS, MINUTEMAN, WHEEL 
HOUSE, WASHINGTON SWITCH, CAOCOMNET, 
JOTS, JCSAN, and JCCs. NEACP: Resources for 
leased/government-owned circuitry, personnel, installation, 
hardware improvement, construction and other activities 
which interconnect the NEACP with multiple facilities of 
the NMCS, agencies and command centers via ground 
entry points. NMCC: Resources for leased circuitry 
personnel, installations, hardware improvement, 
construction and other activities which interconnect the 
NMCC with the ANMCC and with communications 
networks that in turn provide access to other command 
centers and the Unified and Specified Commands. NAVY: 
Resources to include leased/government-owned circuitry 
supporting the NMCS which interconnect multiple 
facilities of the NMCS, including digital, video, facsimile 
teletype or voice related systems. Excludes all NMCS 
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resources identified and reported in PEs 0302012A, 
0302052F and 03034010. 
63851F Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) - 
Demonstration/V
alidation 
ICBM - DEM/VAL - Includes demonstration and 
validation development efforts to support Minuteman 
efforts focused on extending the service life of Minuteman 
III through 2020, including replacing 1960 vintage 
electronics in the guidance system and refurbishing 
propulsion stages to correct age-related degradation and to 
maintain reliability. 
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Appendix F: AFCAIG Process (SAF/FMCC) 
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Minuteman III Cost Per 
Alert Hour Anal sis 
Capt Allen R. Miller 
Co-Advisor: Dr. William Cunningham 
Co-Advisor: Dr. Jeffery Ogden 
Department of Operational Sciences (ENS) 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Introduction Models and Resu lts 
This research analyzes the cost associated with the Minuteman III (lvW III) 
weapon system The research develops three models for detennining MM III 
costs per alert hour(CPAH). The first model is based on the Air Force Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group cost per flying hour model. The model is modified 
to include depot level reparables, conswnables, and persoiUlel costs. The second 
model is based on the Office oft he Secreta ryofD efense, Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group cost per flying hour model and is formulated using service-
wide data from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost tool. The third model is a 
comprehensive model includ ing ind irect costs a ssociated the ICBM-supp:>rting 
installations. Additionally, this research includes a CPAH for each echelon or 
level of management fort he M:M: m 
Resea rch Q u estio ns 
• Can the Air Force Cost Analysis lmprovementGroup(AFCAIG) and Office of 
the Secretary ofDefense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD CAIG) 
aircraft cost per fly ing hour models be used to develop cost per alerl hour models 
f or the LG}tlf-30 weaponsystem 7 If so, what are the d ifferences? 
• Do cost per alert hour factors change significantlybasedon the level of 
management? 
• What cost drivers should be included in developing a comprehensive CPAH 
model for theLGM-30 weapon system? 
• What is the relationship of costs and alert hours? 
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